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THE CLOUD AND THE DEEP SEA: HOW CLOUD
STORAGE RAISES THE STAKES FOR UNDERSEA
CABLE SECURITY AND LIABILITY
Lixian Loong Hantover*

[T]he Internet is many things, in many places. But one thing it most
certainly is, nearly everywhere, is, in fact, a series of tubes. There are
tubes that connect London and New York. Tubes that connect Google
and Facebook. There are buildings filled with tubes, and hundreds of
thousands of miles of road and railroad tracks, beside which lie buried
tubes. Everything you do online travels through a tube. Inside those
tubes (by and large) are glass fibers. Inside those fibers is light.
Encoded in that light is, increasingly, us.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Our data is moving into the cloud. While in the past we stored data
on the computers on our desks, now we increasingly give control of our
data to far-away professionals and give up our hard drives for storage
online in the “cloud.”2 A PEW report in 2008 found that sixty-nine
percent of Americans had either stored files online or used a web-based
software application at least once.3 Now over one exabyte, or over one
* J.D., UCLA School of Law; B.A. University of Chicago; Associate, Wilson,
Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, P.C. I would like to thank Curtis Hessler for his help and
encouragement and my parents for their constant support. In addition, I would like to
thank Ciera Dye and the editors of the Ocean & Coastal Law Journal for their hard work.
The views expressed in this article reflect the views of the author alone and do not
necessarily reflect the views of Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, P.C.
1. ANDREW BLUM, TUBES: A JOURNEY TO THE CENTER OF THE INTERNET 5-6 (2012).
Blum writes this in response to Senator Ted Stevens’ famous quote that the Internet is
just a series of tubes. Id. at 5.
2. Id. at 230. The cloud refers to any storage on the Internet, but it is hardly
cloudlike. Id. Data is in fact being stored on massive data centers. Id.
3. Janna Q. Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Future of Cloud Computing, PEW INTERNET
& AM. LIFE PROJECT 8 (Jun. 11, 2010), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/The-futureof-cloud-computing.aspx. This figure does not include popular cloud services like
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billion gigabytes, of data is stored among the many cloud services like
Gmail and Dropbox.4 Amazon’s S3 cloud storage service, which
provides the cloud storage space for companies like Dropbox,5 stores 762
billion objects.6 That is enough for 108 objects per person on earth.7 In
2013, the cloud market is predicted to grow by 18.5 percent.8 By 2016, it
is estimated that users will store more than one third of their digital
content in the cloud.9
It is not just individuals accessing their documents via Dropbox that
make up this migration to the cloud. Companies looking to save on
expensive hardware and the salaries of the IT professionals required to
maintain that expensive hardware are also looking toward the cloud for
their own data storage.10
Because individuals and businesses
increasingly rely on the cloud to perform basic functions, reliable access
to that cloud is not merely important – it is critical. The concerns about

Dropbox which launched in 2008 and has been accumulating users ever since. See Jason
Kincaid, Dropbox Acquires The Domain Everyone Thought It Had: Dropbox.com, TECH
CRUNCH (Oct. 13, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/10/13/dropbox-acquires-thedomain-everyone-thought-it-had-dropbox-com/.
4. John Callaham, Over One Exabyte of Data is Now Stored in the Cloud, NEOWIN
(Feb. 20, 2013, 02:45), http://www.neowin.net/news/research-firm-over-1-exabyte-ofdata-is-now-stored-in-the-cloud. To put this amount of data in perspective, Eric Schmidt,
the former CEO of Google estimated that the total of all human knowledge created from
the dawn of man until 2003 amounted to five exabytes. James Bamford, The Black Box,
WIRED (Mar. 30, 2012), available at http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2012/05/
features/the-black-box?page=all.
5. Where
Does
Dropbox
Store
Everyone’s
Data?,
DROPBOX,
https://www.dropbox.com/help/7/en (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
6. Rich Miller, Amazon: 762 Billion Objects Stored on S3 Cloud, DATA CENTER
KNOWLEDGE (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2012/01/31/
amazon-762-billion-objects-stored-on-s3-cloud/. In this article, the cloud refers to both
cloud services like Google, which are considered Saas (Software as a service) and cloud
services like Amazon or Rackspace, which are considered Iaas (Infrastructure as a
service).
7. Id.
8. Brandon Butler, Gartner: Public Cloud Market to Grow 18.5% this Year,
NETWORK WORLD (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2013/022813gartner-public-cloud-267223.html.
9. Gartner Says That Consumers Will Store More Than a Third of Their Digital
Content in the Cloud by 2016, GARTNER (June 25, 2012), available at
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/-id/2060215.
10. Joseph A. Schoorl, Comment, Clicking the “Export” Button: Cloud Data Storage
and U.S. Dual-Use Export Controls, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 632, 634-5 (2012); Pete
Eppele, Six Reasons to Move to the Cloud, WIRED (Oct 4, 2012, 1:55 PM),
http://www.wired.com/insights/2012/10/move-to-cloud-consider-saas/.
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cloud storage are thus two-fold: the security of the data itself11 and the
security of our access to that data.12
This article focuses on the latter concern. Specifically, this article
focuses on the security of one critical component of the global Internet
infrastructure that we use to access the cloud: undersea cables. These
cables once carried only transatlantic telegraph messages. Now they
carry any kind of communication – telephone calls, emails, bank account
transfers – across the globe.13 Accessing files from the cloud is just one
of the many ways we rely on this infrastructure.
As cloud storage grows and multinational companies begin to rely on
these cables to access their files, the potential economic impact of a
breach of these cables becomes catastrophic. This article argues that the
growth in cloud storage has raised the stakes when it comes to undersea
cable security by making our ability to access our day-to-day files
dependent on them. Furthermore, it is unclear who, if anyone, would be
responsible for the economic loss associated with a loss of access to
those files.
Part II of this article explores the idea of cloud storage and how
access to information in the cloud has become a global issue that relies
on undersea cables. It examines the structural flaws in undersea cable
security and the inability of the current legal system to compensate
victims for the loss of access to data in the event of a breach of undersea
cable security. Part III explores and critiques various solutions to ensure
that access to data in the cloud remains safe from undersea cable
breaches and that any economic loss due to cable breaches can be
compensated. This article then advocates in Part IV for a solution that
includes a shift of liability to cloud storage providers and increased
redundancy requirements.

11. John Villasenor, Addressing Export Control in the Age of Cloud Computing,
BROOKINGS 1 (July 25, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/07/25cloud-computing-villasenor.
12. See Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584, 637 (2011)
(explaining the importance of access to information).
13. See PROTECTIVE SEC. DIVISION, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CHARACTERISTICS AND
COMMON VULNERABILITIES INFRASTRUCTURE CATEGORY: CABLE LANDING STATIONS 7
(Draft - Jan. 15, 2004) available at http://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-UCL-CV.pdf;
BLUM, supra note 1, at 6. Stephen Malphus, the chief of staff to Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernake was quoted as saying that when communications networks go
down, the financial sector does not merely grind to a halt, it snaps to a halt. MICHAEL
MATIS, THE PROTECTION OF UNDERSEA CABLES: A GLOBAL SECURITY THREAT 1 (U.S.
Army War College 2012), available at www.hsdl.org/?view&-did=718794.
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II. UNDERSEA CABLES TODAY: USE, SECURITY, AND
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES
A. Why the Cloud (and the Global Economy) Needs Undersea Cables
These days, the answer to the question “where is my data” is no
longer simple. In the past, the answer would have been “on my
computer,” “on this disk,” or “on my server in my office.” Now
companies and consumers are moving their data to the cloud: a vast
network of servers that can be accessed anywhere there is an Internet
connection.14 For users, the cloud enables them to be a few clicks away
from their data no matter what computer they are using. If a user’s
computer breaks or becomes infected, the data in the cloud is insulated
and can just be accessed from a different computer.15 Put simply, your
data is in on a separate server, which you can access from any Internet
connected device. While the user, be it an individual or a company,
might be in Los Angeles, the server with their data could be anywhere
from Wyoming to Singapore.16
So if your files are on a server in Singapore and you are living in Los
Angeles, how do you access these servers all around the world?17 If
asked, many of us might think that our communications are carried
mostly over the air via satellite. Therefore, many of us may assume that
we access the cloud via satellite connections – literally in the “clouds.”
But this is not the case.18 In fact, it is estimated that satellites only have
the capacity to carry seven percent of the total Internet traffic to and from

14. Schoorl, supra note 10, at 635; see also Jonathan Strickland, How Cloud Storage
Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/cloud-computing/cloudstorage1.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2013, 5:55 PM).
15. Schoorl, supra note 10, at 634.
16. For example, Google has servers in Singapore, Finland and Taiwan. Data Centers,
GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/datacenters/inside/locations/ (last visited Dec. 4,
2012).
17. This article does not suggest that all access to data stored in the cloud utilizes
undersea cables. If your data is stored in the same country or city that you are in, it is
likely that no undersea cables will be used to access your data.
18. Douglas R. Burnett, Cable Vision, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 2011, at
67 [hereinafter Burnett, Cable Vision]. See also Jon Brodkin, Bandwidth Explosion: As
Internet Use Soars, Can Bottlenecks be Averted?, ARS TECHNICA (May 1, 2012, 9:40
AM),
http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/05/bandwidth-explosion-as-internet-usesoars-can-bottlenecks-be-averted/.
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the United States.19 Instead, it is the global undersea cable network that
is the “fundamental medium of the global village.”20

Fig. 1.1. Reprinted from Bobbie Johnson, How One Clumsy Ship Cut Off the Web for 75
Million People, THE GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 1, 2008, at 22.

This undersea cable network, illustrated in Figure 1.1, is made up of
over two hundred submarine cables that crisscross the ocean floor,21
carrying millions of messages and facilitating over one trillion dollars in
daily transactions. 22 The longest cable, called the “Southern Cross”

19. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 67.
20. BLUM, supra note 1, at 193. See also Sebastian Anthony, The Secret World of
TECH
(Sept.
21,
2011,
7:30
AM),
Submarine
Cables,
EXTREME
http://www.extremetech.com/computing/96827-the-secret-world-of-submarine-cables
(“Across these cables, which span distances of up to 13,00o [sic] km (8,000 miles) and
have total lengths over 21,000 km (13,000 miles), terabits of information squirt from one
side of the planet to another. To get from London to Tokyo, your packets can traverse
Europe, the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and finally
the South China Sea — or they can hop across the Atlantic, the entirety of continental
North America, and then long haul over the Pacific.”).
21. John Brandon, Protecting the Submarine Cables That Wire Our World, POPULAR
MECHANICS (Mar. 15, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/
engineering/-infrastructure/protecting-the-submarine-calbes-that-wire-our-world15220942?click=pm_latest.
22. MATIS, supra note 13, at 1.
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stretches over 18,500 miles across the Pacific Ocean.23 In addition,
twelve more lines are scheduled for construction in 2013, which will
connect more countries than ever before, including the small island
nation of Tonga.24 In the United States, just thirty-six cables carry more
than ninety-five percent of all international voice, data and video
communications.25 Thus, the global communications system depends
heavily on undersea cables, regardless of cloud storage.26
With the rise of cloud storage, our need to access international
servers has increased our reliance on this global undersea cable
infrastructure.27 In general, undersea cables carry our data to servers to
be stored, and subsequently carry requested data back from the servers to
us. 28 If cables were severed between a user in Country A and a server on
which the user’s data was stored in Country B, the user would be unable
to access their data.29 Our access to the cloud and cloud storage currently
relies on undersea cables.30
This is not to say that if one cable connecting Country A to Country
B is cut, all Internet traffic between the two countries will cease. A
single cut to a submarine cable “typically has little impact [on Internet
traffic because] the communications may be rerouted through alternative

23. Brandon, supra note 21. “In 2004 alone, approximately $7.4 trillion [was] traded
on cables transmitted between 208 countries [on a daily basis].” MATIS, supra note 13, at
1.
24. Brandon, supra note 21.
25. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 67. See also MATIS, supra note 13, at 9
(stating that “[i]f the exact location[s] of the [thirty-six] cables in the [United States] were
identified, a successful [terrorist] attack on a few of those locations could affect roughly
[ninety-five] percent” of Internet traffic on the East Coast).
26. Bamford, supra note 4, at 83. This dependence on undersea cables will only
increase because global Internet traffic is estimated to reach 966 exabytes per year by
2015. Id. Many of the security risks and subsequent liability issues discussed in this
article apply just as readily to other services that rely on undersea cable infrastructure.
This article focuses on access to data in the cloud but acknowledges that disruptions to
other cloud-reliant services could be equally catastrophic. For example, given the
reliance of the financial industry on these cables to transfer billions of dollars per day, a
large-scale disruption could cripple the industry.
27. See, e.g., SEACOM Upgrades Submarine Network Capacity to Turbo-Boost
African Internet, SEACOM (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.seacom.mu/news/article124/seacom-upgrades-submarine-network-capacity-to-turbo-boost-african-internet/
(noting that the rise in cloud computing has been cited as a reason to upgrade undersea
cables).
28. See Brandon, supra note 21.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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cables.”31 Countries like the United States, for example, are connected to
the outside world by multiple cables.32
As the amount of cable disruptions increases (i.e., more cables are
cut), on the other hand, the amount of data traffic that is lost increases
exponentially.33 For example, an analysis was done of possible
disruptions of the cable lines connecting Europe and India.34 It found
that although “India is fairly resilient in the case of one or two cable
disruptions,” nearly seventy percent of traffic to and from India would be
lost with just three concurrent cable disruptions.35 Actual data exists that
supports similar predictions.36 In 2006, an earthquake along the coast of
Taiwan triggered undersea landslides and broke nine undersea cables.37
This event had repercussions extending beyond the country of Taiwan.38
Internet telecommunications linking Southeast Asia were seriously
impaired.39 More than six hundred gigabits of capacity went offline, and
trading of the Korean won temporarily stopped.40 Even a week after the
quake, an Internet provider in Hong Kong publicly apologized for
continued slow Internet speeds.41
If companies and users continue to move their data into the cloud,
and therefore continue to rely more on undersea cables to access the
cloud for their day-to-day needs, we must consider two key problems.
First, we must consider structural issues, which concern potential
31. John K. Crain, Assessing Resilience in the Global Cable Infrastructure 13 (Jun.
2012) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School) (on file with the Naval
Postgraduate
School),
available
at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA562772; but see Tom
Parfitt, Georgian Woman Cuts off Web Access to Whole of Armenia, THE GUARDIAN,
(Apr. 6, 2011, 15:12) http://m.guardiannews.com/world/2011/apr/06/georgian-womancuts-web-access (a 75 year old woman in Georgia cut one terrestrial cable with her shovel
and accidentally cut off the Internet for the entire country of Armenia).
32. That being said, all but one of the U.S. transatlantic cables lands within the same
thirty-mile radius on the east coast of the United States. Limited access to landing
stations in the United States has created chokepoints for cables, increasing the
vulnerability of the system as a whole. MATIS, supra note 13, at 7.
33. Crain, supra note 31.
34. Id. at 35.
35. Id. at 41. It is important to note that these disruptions did not even have to occur
in Indian waters; some of the more devastating scenarios involved breaches off the coast
of France. Id. at 47.
36. Id. at 9.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. BLUM, supra note 1, at 200.
41. Id.
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disruptions to the undersea cable infrastructure. Second, we must
recognize liability issues, which relate to the fallout of large-scale
disruptions. Who will compensate parties for the ever-increasing
potential economic damages? How do we protect companies and users
from the economic impact undersea cable disruptions will have on them?
The security concerns about undersea cable disruptions are by no
means new. In World War II, for example, undersea cable operators in
Porthcurno, England installed flamethrowers on beaches and took other
precautions to protect cable stations against Nazi sabotage.42
Likewise, the question of who will pay for damage caused by cable
disruptions is not a new concern and has been litigated extensively.43
The stakes, however, have changed because cables no longer concern
only communication. Now financial markets and multi-billion dollar
businesses rely on the efficiency and strength of the undersea cable
infrastructure.44 Individuals and entities rely on cables not only to
communicate or transfer funds, but also to access their day-to-day files.45
As a result, the adoption of cloud storage has drastically increased the
potential economic fallout of a major cable disruption. The rise of cloud
storage has not created the problem of undersea cable security and
liability; it has simply made these problems critical.

42. Id. at 203-205; see also Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 69. In fact cable
cutting as a tactic of war spans all the way back to the Spanish American War when the
United States cut the cables linking Spain to its colonies. BLUM, supra note 1, at 200.
Similarly, the first offensive action taken by the British Navy during World War I was to
cut off Germany’s links to the rest of the world by severing its undersea cables. Id.
43. See, e.g., AT & T Corp v. Tyco Telecomms., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 294, 307
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (confirming an arbitration award requiring the owner of a vessel that
severed a submarine underwater transatlantic telecommunications cable to compensate
the owners of the cable for damages incurred in repairing the cable and restoring affected
traffic by rerouting it across other networks while repairs were being completed);
Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal v. United States, 287 U.S. 170, 177 (1932) (libel in
admiralty).
44. The financial sector would not suffer from the effects of a cable breach in
isolation. Industries enmeshed in the global economy through the Internet also include
shipping, airlines and manufacturing. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 67; see
also MATIS, supra note 13, at 3 (stating that “[w]hen a cable loses service, it has a
definite, but difficult impact [on] the global financial sector”). The International Cable
Protection Committee (ICPC) legal advisor estimates that interruptions of underwater
fiber optics communications systems have a financial impact in excess of one and a half
million dollars per hour. MATIS, supra note 13, at 3.
45. Id.
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B. Structural Vulnerability of Undersea Cables:
Breaks are Likely to Occur
The previous section discussed how merely a few simultaneous
breaches of undersea cables could cause huge disruptions in data traffic
and therefore have huge ramifications for businesses relying on those
cables. But how likely is it that simultaneous disruptions will actually
occur? Are the cables themselves safe? Structurally, undersea cables are
extremely vulnerable and therefore disruptions are likely. Despite the
huge amounts of data traffic that flow through these cables, each one is
merely the size of a garden hose.46 In water depths of less than fifteen
hundred meters, cables are buried in yard-deep trenches beneath the
ocean floor and armored with a steel sheath.47 This helps to protect
against the most common kind of undersea cable disruption: accidental
breakage by trawl fishing and ship anchors.48 In water depths in excess
of fifteen hundred meters, however, where breakages from anchors are
unlikely, cables are laid on the ocean floor and are otherwise
unprotected.49 Even with these precautions, there are an average of two
hundred cable faults50 worldwide each year.51
Although the majority of these faults are caused unintentionally by
anchors, fishing equipment, and occasionally sharks,52 terrorism and
piracy are genuine concerns.53 The location of cables along the ocean
floor is made readily available to mariners, commercial bottom
fishermen, and undersea seabed developers so that they do not
accidentally damage the cables.54 Anyone who wishes to tamper with the
cables by cutting or using explosives55 could easily access their location
via the Internet.56

46. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 67.
47. MATIS, supra note 13, at 8.
48. Of the roughly two hundred submarine fiber-optic cable faults worldwide every
year, up to seventy-seven percent are caused by anchors and fishing gear. Burnett, Cable
Vision, supra note 18, at 67.
49. Id.
50. In this article, the terms “fault,” “breach,” and “disruption” are used
interchangeably.
51. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 67.
52. Id.; see also Sudmike, Shark Attack on Subcable, YOUTUBE (Apr. 22, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ex7uTQf4bQ.
53. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 67.
54. MATIS, supra note 13, at 2.
55. Id. at 13.
56. Id. at 2.
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Undersea cable expert Douglas R. Burnett argues that “it is naïve to
assume that submarine-cable landing stations, cables, the cable ships, and
the marine depots that maintain the systems will escape asymmetric
terrorist acts,”57 and recent cases have proven that Burnett’s concern is
not unfounded. In 2007, “piracy was blamed in the theft of active
submarine cables and equipment” off the coast of Vietnam.58 “In early
2008, over the course of just a few days, multiple cables were cut off the
coasts of Egypt and Dubai,” causing at least fourteen countries to lose a
significant amount of data traffic.59 The “Maldives was entirely
disconnected from the rest of the world.”60 The short time span and close
proximity of these cuts raised suspicions of a deliberate attack.61 Most
recently, in June 2010, terrorists in the Philippines struck an international
cable.62 The public location of the cables and their lack of sophisticated
armor or protection make them incredibly vulnerable to intentional
attacks.
A further concern is the security of cable landing stations. These
stations are the “dry” component of the undersea cable infrastructure that
connects the undersea cables to domestic terrestrial cable infrastructure.63
The landing stations are above ground and highly visible and thus are
vulnerable to attack.64 These attacks need not be as sophisticated as
attacks on undersea cables. For example, cars with explosives could be
parked close to a landing station.65 While damage to cable stations can
be more easily repaired than breaches that occur in the deep sea, these
cable landing stations often serve multiple undersea cables.66 As a result,
a successful attack on one cable landing station can simultaneously
disrupt multiple cables.67
57. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 69.
58. Crain, supra note 31, at 9.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.; but see Bobbie Johnson, How One Clumsy Ship Cut Off the Web for 75
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
31,
2008),
Million
People,
THE
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/feb/01/internationalpersonalfinancebusiness.i
nternet (reporting that the cut was initially thought to have been the result of a boating
accident).
62. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 69.
63. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 13, at 3-6.
64. Id. at 7.
65. Id. at 9 (listing many security vulnerabilities of cable landing stations).
66. See id. at 7.
67. See SUBMARINE CABLE NETWORKS, http://submarinenetworks.com/stations/northamerica (last visited Sept. 23, 2013) (listing U.S. cable stations and the undersea cables
that they serve). The U.S. satellite system contains similar “earth stations” that house
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C. Governments Are Not Taking Adequate Measures to Protect Undersea
Cables and Deter Attackers
Perhaps even more troubling than the above-mentioned structural
vulnerability of undersea cables is the lack of security efforts and
criminal sanctions by governments to protect undersea cables and deter
future attacks.68 U.S. National Intelligence director James Clapper
recently testified that cyber attacks, (by which he meant purely digital
attacks like computer worms or viruses that can shut down the electrical
grid or financial markets),69 are the nation’s number one security
priority.70 Clapper highlighted how much governments, utilities, and
financial services rely on the Internet and therefore are vulnerable to
cyber attack.71 Yet at the same time, protection of undersea cables (a
critical infrastructure that supports the Internet) from physical attacks is
sorely lacking. For example, in the United States, the willful destruction
of an international submarine cable is punishable by a maximum of two
years in prison and a mere $5,000 fine.72 This fine is hardly a deterrent,
and is far out of proportion to the damage that such an act would cause.
Furthermore, the United States has not joined the 162 countries that have
signed onto the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).73 As a result, there are no UNCLOS security protections for
numerous receivers, Bamford, supra note 4, at 83, and are thus vulnerable to the same
kinds of attacks as cable landing stations. For example, one of AT & T’s powerful earth
stations, located in Roaring Creek, Pennsylvania, houses three 105-foot dishes that handle
much of the U.S. communications to and from Europe and the Middle East. Id. Another
AT & T earth station in California contains three dishes that service the Pacific Rim and
Asia. Id. An attack on one of these stations could significantly disrupt satellite
communication. While this article does not discuss the U.S. satellite system and its
security in detail, it is definitely worth further study.
68. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 68.
69. A cyber-attack is usually thought of as a completely digital attack that utilizes a
computer network or system to carry out the attack. Cyberattack, TECHOPEDIA.COM,
http://www.techopedia.com/definition/24748/cyberattack (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
However, Oona Hathaway and her co-authors have advocated for a definition of “cyber
attack,” which focuses on the ends (attacking cyber systems). Oona A. Hathaway et al.,
The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CAL. L. REV. 817, 826-27 (2012). A bombing of an
undersea cable meant to disrupt the Internet would fall under Hathaway’s definition of
cyber-attack because its intended effect is to disrupt the cyber system. See id.
70. Matt Vasilogambros, America’s 3 Biggest Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities, NAT’L J.
(Mar. 13, 2013, 4:00 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/america-s-3biggest-cybersecurity-vunerabilities-20130313.
71. Id.
72. 47 U.S.C.A. § 21 (2006); Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 68.
73. Id. at 69.

12

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:1

U.S. undersea cables outside of U.S. waters.74 Only Australia and
Singapore have created a single point of contact within their
governments to address issues of undersea cable security and to
coordinate with cable owners to combat hostile actions.75 On a
worldwide level, no organization is responsible for undersea cables and
there have been no international tests of cable defense systems.76 The
maintenance and security of the cables is left to private trade
organizations.77 Given the extent to which governments themselves rely
on these cables,78 the current lack of a coherent undersea cable security
strategy by governments must be remedied. The infrastructure itself is
vulnerable, and governments like the United States are not yet taking
adequate actions to protect it. It is not enough for governments like the
United States to focus on digital attacks on Internet systems. They must
also take action to protect the physical structure of the Internet.79
D. Who Pays for the Damages Resulting from
Undersea Cable Disruptions?
The second issue surrounding undersea cables is the question of
liability. In the event that a breach of an undersea cable does occur, who
pays for the damage? In 1998, the privately owned TAT-10 undersea
cable than runs across the Atlantic Ocean was severed by a ship operated

74. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 69.
75. Id. at 70.
76. MATIS, supra note 13, at 10.
77. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 67-69.
78. MATIS, supra note 13, at 10 (explaining that the Department of Defense’s netcentric warfare and global information grid rely on undersea cables and that breaches to
these cables would risk the capabilities of modern U.S. warfare).
79. The Obama administration recently released an executive order on cybersecurity.
Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 12, 2013). Part of the order focused on
the need to develop a framework to gather and share intelligence on risks to privately
owned critical infrastructure. Id. This is a step forward in that it indicates awareness that
there is a lack of protection of critical infrastructure. However, it is unclear what this
intelligence framework would entail and how much the government would be involved
in the physical protection of Internet infrastructure. See id.; see also Roland L. Trope &
Stephen J. Humes, By Executive Order: Delivery of Cyber Intelligence Imparts Cyber
R e spon sib ili ti e s, IEE E S E C . & P R I V A C Y (M ar ./ Ap r . 2013 ), a vai labl e a t
http://www.hklaw.com/files/Publication/ab69bb14-30d2-41f0-bcab-5ae08947a7ab/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5226c0f7-8993-48a0-9c40-6262cef78e27/
By%20Executive%20Order%20%28final%20submission%20draft%29.pdf (analyzing the
implications of the executive order for infrastructure providers).
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by Tyco, Inc.80 Tyco was ordered to pay the owners of TAT-10 over five
million dollars in damages.81 This amount included not only costs
incurred in repairing the damaged cable but also the costs incurred by the
owners of TAT-10 when they had to re-route the traffic via rival-owned
undersea and terrestrial cable lines.82 This scenario, in which one party
negligently severs a cable belonging to another party, is the typical case
addressing damages to undersea cables after they occur. In these cases,
both in the United States and internationally, the party that causes the
breach is liable to the cable owner for the costs of repair and
replacement.83 For example, in the United States, cable owners recover
based on the law of torts.84 The doctrine of trespass to chattel (in this
case, the cable) enables a cable owner to recover for loss of use based on
difference in value or cost of repair.85 In cases like AT & T v. Tyco, this
measure of damages has been interpreted to include the costs of rerouting
traffic to other cables. 86 On average, the cost of a single repair is one to
three million dollars plus. 87 Costs vary based on factors such as the
distance between the breach and the repair ship, weather, coastal state
permitting requirements, and the engineering skills of the crew.88
Not included in these cases are economic damages to third parties
who are unable to conduct business when cable lines go down, whether
they be individual consumers or multinational companies. These cases
merely involve the cable owner and the tortfeasor who damages the
cable. The question remains whether third party consumers who rely on
the cloud have a cause of action against either the party who causes the
cable fault or the cable owners themselves for losses that they incur from
not being able to access their data.89
What would this potential claim look like? In most cases of
undersea cable breaches, which are due to anchors or trawl fishing, a
80. AT & T Corp. v. Tyco Telecomms., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 294, 297 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
81. Id. at 298.
82. Id.
83. Douglas R. Burnett, Recovery of Cable Repair Ship Cost Damages From Third
Parties That Injure Submarine Cables, 35 TUL. MAR. L.J. 103, 122 (2010) [hereinafter
Burnett, Recovery].
84. See id. at 112.
85. Id.
86. AT & T Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d at 302.
87. Burnett, Recovery, supra note 83, at 108.
88. Id. at 108-109.
89. Note that this section and other sections in this article that have to do with issues
of ex-post liability are focused on U.S. law only. However, many of the ideas could
potentially be applicable in other countries as well.
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tortfeasor’s negligence leads to the cutting of one cable.90 Cable
operators are typically prepared for this and have created re-routing
agreements whereby one cable company agrees to carry the traffic of its
competitor should the competitor’s cable sustain damage and vice
versa.91 As a result, the dangers of severe economic damage to third
parties are slim in these cases. On the other hand, a natural disaster or
pirate or terrorist attack that disables several cables simultaneously could
lead to loss of access to data, as both the original cable and the re-routing
cable would potentially be severed. Repairs often take up to one to two
weeks to complete.92 As a result, companies and users could lose access
to their data for a prolonged period of time and could incur huge amounts
of financial losses.93 These users would look to the legal system to
recover for the economic damage they had suffered. Unfortunately, it is
unlikely that the current legal framework offers them much recourse.
Firstly, who would these users sue to recover? In the case of natural
disasters, there is no tortfeasor from whom to recover. In the case of
pirates or terrorists there are issues of sovereignty,94 and even if there
were not, these tortfeasors would probably not have the means to
compensate victims. The only feasible claim is against the owner of the
cables themselves, which would in turn be backed by insurers. Users
would want to bring actions under tort law against cable companies (who
would hopefully have adequate insurance) for negligence in failing to
take precautions against foreseeable attacks and disasters.95
Unfortunately for these consumers, the majority rule in tort actions is
that damages for “economic loss” are not recoverable on a negligence
claim when the economic damages are not accompanied by property

90. See Burnett, Recovery, supra note 83, at 104.
91. AT & T Corp., 255 F. Supp. 2d at 297.
92. MATIS, supra note 13, at 6.
93. These damages could range from lesser amounts for a small business that is
unable to operate for a day to huge amounts for businesses like financial institutions that
can handle trillions of dollars and millions of transactions each day. See, e.g., Burnett,
Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 67.
94. Id. at 68 (discussing how prosecuting pirates has proven difficult because of these
issues).
95. It is not that these terrorist attacks are not foreseeable. The vulnerability of the
undersea infrastructure and increased frequency of attacks makes a simultaneous attack
on the cable infrastructure if not probable, at least foreseeable. However, from a broader
policy perspective, it is unclear whether we would want consumers to be able to bring
actions against cable companies. If companies knew they were potentially on the hook
for billions of dollars in damage they would likely be unable to obtain insurance and may
choose to exit the market entirely.
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damage.96 Exceptions to the economic loss rule cover cases involving
physical injury or malpractice suits against lawyers and accountants, but
do not apply to this situation.97 In the case of undersea cable disruptions,
users have not themselves incurred any physical damage. They have
only lost revenue due to the loss of access to their data. As a result, it is
unlikely a court would allow recovery for these economic damages in
claims of negligence against cable owners. Consumers relying on cloud
storage may find themselves unprotected from losses of data due to
undersea cable damage.
It is possible, however, that contract law could provide some
recourse in situations where the consumer and the cable operator are in
contract with one another. In cases governed by contract law, damages
are controlled by terms in the contract.98 In recent years, cloud based
service providers have themselves become owners of undersea cable
infrastructure.99 Facebook recently joined a consortium building a new

96. ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS § 3.6 (6th ed. 2005).
Future scholarship may want to begin to broach the topic of when information becomes
property or if the loss of access to data can ever be considered a property loss. However,
this article assumes that for now at least, a loss of access to data is not damage to
property.
97. Id. at § 3.8. Even if a court did allow companies to recover from cable owners,
there would still be the issue of whether the economic loss in question was too tenuously
removed from the damage to the cable. In Kinsman Transit Company v. City of Buffalo,
a ship belonging to the Kinsman Transit Company became unmoored and crashed into
and destroyed a bridge. Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821, 822 (2d
Cir. 1968). The two plaintiffs in the case brought suit against the transit company and the
city of Buffalo to recover for economic loss. Id. at 824. Plaintiff A brought suit because
as a result of the bridge being unavailable, it was unable to transport its wheat and had to
purchase replacement wheat to fulfill a contract. Id. at 823. Plaintiff B sought to recover
the costs of equipment it was forced to rent to unload its cargo from a ship that was
blocked by ice due to the accident. Id. The court in both cases found that the damage to
the plaintiffs was too ‘remote’ or ‘indirect’ a consequence of the defendants' negligence
and denied their requests for recovery. Id. at 824. It is likely in the case of cable damage
and subsequent loss of data that the economic damage would be considered even more
tenuous.
98. DAVID W. TOLLEN, THE TECH CONTRACTS HANDBOOK 108 (2010). Tollen gives a
good and relevant example to illustrate how this works: “Imagine the provider supplies
defective software. The software malfunctions, and as a result, the recipient loses a
million dollars. Imagine also that the limitation of liability clause caps the provider’s
liability at $50,000. The result: the provider is liable for one twentieth of the recipient’s
loss. Even if everyone agrees the malfunction was the provider’s fault, the provider owes
$50K, and that’s all.” Id.
99. Robert McMillan, Facebook Mimics Google with Underwater Cable to Asia,
WIRED (Jul. 5, 2012), http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2012/facebook-submarine/.
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undersea cable in Asia.100 In doing so, it follows in the footsteps of
Google which helped pay for an undersea cable connecting Japan to the
United States.101 Thus it is possible, depending on the contract terms,
that consumers could recover from cloud providers who are also cable
owners (like Google) that they are in contract with, if the cable breach
leads to downtime in the cloud data storage service. However, here the
largest obstacle is the contract itself. Consumers who use Google Docs
to store their work documents must sign an agreement that absolves
Google of any liability for economic harm to the consumer.102 This
provision would likely absolve Google of having to pay a consumer for
the loss they experience should a cable be breached.103 The only
exception would be if a court found the contract to be unconscionable or
opposed to public policy.104 But this would be unlikely to occur.105 In
contracts, as in torts, it is unlikely that a user would be able to recover for
economic harms suffered even if those harms rose into the billions of
dollars.
III. HOW TO PROTECT VULNERABLE INFRASTRUCTURE AND
PROVIDE RECOURSE FOR CABLE BREAKS: POSSIBLE BUT
PROBLEMATIC SOLUTIONS
Part II demonstrated not only that the physical infrastructure of
undersea cables is vulnerable to intentional disruptions, but also how
difficult it would be for those affected by a disruption to recover for any
economic loss they experience as a result of losing access to their data.
With cloud computing on the rise, it has never been more critical to
ensure the safety of the world’s undersea cables. Should a breakage
occur, cloud computing customers will need to have some recourse to
recover for their economic loss. This Part explores and critiques possible

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Andrew Couts, Upload at Your Own Risk: Most Cloud Storage Services Offer No
Data Guarantee, DIGITAL TRENDS (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/
computing/upload-at-your-own-risk-most-cloud-storage-services-offer-no-data-guarantee/.
103. Id.
104. TOLLEN, supra note 98, at 111.
105. See generally Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism –
The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 1-5 (2012)
(discussing how the area of unconscionability in boilerplate contracts is evolving).
However, it is hard to imagine judges voiding contracts and thus opening up companies
to huge amounts of liability, especially when the user is a company that could have stored
its data elsewhere.
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but problematic solutions to the structural and liability issues raised in
the previous sections.
Part IV then advocates for a proposal
incorporating data redundancy, government subsidized insurance, and
shifted liability aimed specifically at safeguarding access to the cloud.
Possible Solution A: Increase Security and International Preparedness
Most of the solutions that have been put forward by scholars focus
on the structural security issues alone and what governments must do to
secure this vital infrastructure. Douglas Burnett argues that governments
should follow the lead of Australia and Singapore and coordinate a single
point of contact for undersea cable issues.106 He suggests that the U.S.
Navy should reach out to naval allies such as Canada and France as well
as to cable industry representatives and together develop cable-protection
strategies that enable the navy to respond quickly to pirate and terrorist
attacks.107 Commander Michael Matis of the U.S. Navy recommends
creating a new international cable construction regulatory regime that
would promote greater international cooperation and information
sharing.108 As part of that effort, he urges the United States to
immediately ratify UNCLOS and encourages UNCLOS members to
collectively update their legislation to protect cables and make it an
international crime to tamper with them.109 These scholars understand
that any action to increase the safety of undersea cables must be
international. Models have shown that a cable break off the coasts of
Marseille could have detrimental effects on data flow in and out of
India.110 In other words, merely increasing security in one’s own waters
will not be sufficient. Any security strategy must be global in scope.
Even if both of the above plans are implemented, however, this will
likely still not solve the problem of structural security. Autonomous
undersea vehicles are now commercially available and can easily dive to
the depths where undersea cables are left unprotected and render them
inoperable by cutting them or laying explosives.111 Unlike in aviation,
undersea vehicles are very hard to find due to low light underwater and

106. Burnett, Cable Vision, supra note 18, at 70-71.
107. Id.
108. MATIS, supra note 13, at 18.
109. Id. at 15-18.
110. Crain, supra note 31, at 46-47.
111. See MATIS, supra note 13, at 12; Laurence R. Wrathall, Comment, The
Vulnerability of Subsea Infrastructure to Underwater Attack: Legal Shortcomings and the
Way Forward, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 223, 237-38 (2010).
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thus low visibility.112 Radars can scan thousands of square miles of air
space but there is no equivalent system underwater.113 Even with
unprecedented cooperation amongst naval forces, it is virtually
impossible to completely police the thousands of miles of undersea cable
infrastructure.114 Therefore, while a ratification of UNCLOS or
increased international cooperation will likely be helpful and increase
global preparedness, it will not be enough to prevent many attacks.
Possible Solution B: Keep All Data Within a Country
One solution is to simply do away with the need for undersea cables
altogether when it comes to data storage in the cloud. Some cloud
storage providers such as Google have allowed customers to pay a
premium and specify where their data is to be kept.115 In Google’s
contract with the City of Los Angeles, Google guaranteed that the city’s
data would remain within the contiguous forty-eight states.116 While this
solution does eliminate the reliance on undersea cables for data storage,
it is problematic. Firstly, the ability of customers to choose where their
data is stored may not be available to smaller customers with limited
bargaining power.117 More importantly, in today’s global economy,
having data servers limited to the United States is unrealistic. Many
companies, large and small, have customers or offices all around the
world. No matter where their data servers are located, undersea cables
will have to be relied upon because some customers will not be located
in the same country as the data server. Having data stored in servers in
every country where a company operates or has customers rather than in
several strategic servers in a few countries is economically inefficient.
While this solution may work for some customers like the City of Los
Angeles, it is not a viable solution for most.

112. Wrathall, supra note 111, at 234.
113. Id. at 234-35. Wrathall explains that underwater concealment maximizes the
impact that a small number of operatives can have, allowing them to place explosives in
multiple locations over an extended time frame and later conduct a coordinated
simultaneous strike. Id.
114. See id.
115. Schoorl, supra note 10, at 636.
116. Patrick Thibodeau, Microsoft’s Cloud-Enabled Office 2010 Set to Join Battle with
Google, COMPUTERWORLD (Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.computerworld.com/s/
article/9175019/Microsoft_s_cloud_enabled_Office_2010_set_to_join_battle_with_Goog
le.
117. Schoorl, supra note 10, at 637.
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Possible Solution C: Creation of a Fund for Data Disruption Victims or
a Subsidized Insurance Plan
Part II explained that the current U.S. legal framework is unlikely to
provide recourse for cloud computing users in the event that there is a
breach of undersea cables and they lose access to their data. As we rely
more and more on undersea cables to form the backbone of our
businesses and economy, the amount of possible economic losses that
users could face begins to reach catastrophic levels. Often in cases of
catastrophes, like floods, the BP oil spill and the terrorist attacks of
September 11th, a fund is created whereby parties who have suffered a
loss due to the event can recover, even if their damages are purely
economic in nature. For example, the BP oil spill was the worst oil spill
in U.S. history.118 The spill had a huge effect not only on the wildlife in
the Gulf of Mexico and local fishermen, but on the communities
surrounding the gulf as well. In New Orleans, there was a twenty-eight
percent drop in tourism even though the city was 150 miles away from
the spill.119 The economic effects of the oil spill rippled far beyond the
accident site. As a result, BP created a fund of over twenty billion
dollars to compensate those affected.120 The fund allowed claimants to
recover for purely economic damages.121 In this case, it was BP, the
negligent party, who contributed to the huge recovery fund.
In the case of the BP oil spill, the tortfeasor had immense funds at its
disposal and was easily identifiable as the responsible party. BP caused
the spill and BP provided the funds to compensate the victims.122 In
situations involving natural disasters or terrorist attacks, however, it is
often the government, the insurer, or if all else fails, the victim, who

118. See Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as
a Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims--A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819, 819
(2011).
119. Allan Kaner et al., Mass Torts Litigation Forum: The Deepwater Horizon Gulf
Oil Spill, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 5 (2010), http://www.kslaw.com/Library/
publication/ABAMassTortsLitigationForum-Reigle-August-2010.pdf.
120. White House: BP Will Pay $20B Into Gulf Spill Fund, NPR (Jun. 16, 2010, 3:24
PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127879786 [hereinafter
White House].
121. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, NATIONAL POLLUTION FUNDS, OIL SPILL CLAIMS
CENTER, http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/claims/#types_of_claims (last visited Dec. 3, 2012) (a
valid claim includes loss of profit and earning capacity).
122. White House, supra note 120.
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bears the burden of the catastrophe.123 The larger and more frequent the
catastrophe, the more likely that private insurance companies will refuse
to offer insurance to cover it.124 Thus if the government does not step in,
victims are left on the hook for any damage. Sometimes this takes the
shape of a fund like the BP oil spill fund, except that the funds are
provided by the government. In the case of the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund, the funds were provided by the government (and
therefore U.S. taxpayers).125 Other times, government aid for victims
comes in the form of insurance. Before 1968, property owners were
forced to assume the risk of flood damage.126 Flooding was considered
so high-risk that private insurance companies refused to cover flood
damage.127 In this case, instead of creating a fund that would dole out
money for individual claims, the government enacted the National Flood
Insurance Act, which subsidized insurance plans managed by private
insurers.128 Property owners were required to purchase insurance exante, unlike in the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, where no
ex-ante action was necessary for recovery.129
It is possible that users who suffer economic loss due to an undersea
cable breach could recover either via a fund like the BP fund or through a
subsidized insurance program like the National Flood Insurance Act.
Neither solution would be perfect. In the case of a fund, who would pay
for the potentially enormous damages? Is the situation of a massive
undersea cable breach more akin to an oil spill where the cable owner
(and any of their insurers) would be held responsible for contributing to
the fund, or would the government be responsible as it was for the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund? In the case of a terrorist or
pirate attack on undersea cables, the responsible terrorists and pirates are
obviously at fault, and so one would think the government should be
responsible for any compensation payouts just as in the September 11th
Fund. On the other hand, it could be argued that the cable companies
were negligent in not taking adequate precautions to secure their cables
123. Robert J. Rhee, Catastrophic Risk and Governance After Hurricane Katrina: A
Postscript to Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 581, 597-98
(2006).
124. Judith Kildow & Jason Scorse, End Federal Flood Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/opinion/end-federal-flood-insurance.html?_r=0.
125. SEPTEMBER
11TH
VICTIM
COMPENSATION
FUND
OF
2001,
http://www.justice.gov/archive/victimcompensation/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2012).
126. Rhee, supra note 123, at 599.
127. Id. at 598.
128. Id. at 599.
129. Id. at 599-600.
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against such outside attacks and in failing to provide sufficient alternate
cables.130 So perhaps the cable companies should be at least partially
responsible for the funds.
The problem with requiring cable companies to pay a large part of a
recovery fund is the likelihood of breaches – either accidental or from
deliberate attack. Undersea cable infrastructure will remain vulnerable
even with the increased security measures suggested above in Proposal
A.131 Cable breaches are much more likely to occur than oil spills or
terrorist attacks.132 Requiring cable companies to pay billions of dollars
in damages to third parties for an event that is likely not preventable by
them could bankrupt smaller cable owners. It could also deter companies
like Google from becoming cable owners and opening themselves up to
this kind of liability. Likewise, it would be hard for these companies to
find willing insurers to cover this kind of likely liability.
It is hard to argue, given the initiation of the breakages by terrorists
or natural disasters, that cable companies should be forced to pay
damages similar to that of the BP oil spill, which was caused by the
negligence of BP’s own agents. As a result, it is most likely that the
burden would fall on the government if a potential fund were to be
created. This would put taxpayers on the hook for a huge bill. Such
legislation to compensate victims for attacks that occur halfway around
the world for damages merely economic in nature may not be perceived
as fair and thus may not be politically viable.133 Therefore, the ability of
the government to create this kind of fund is unclear.
As for insurance, like with flooding, private insurance companies
may not be willing to insure either users or cable owners, given how
likely a simultaneous breach is to occur and how catastrophic the
damages could be. Thus a government-subsidized model would make
sense. In fact, similar models have been suggested for terrorist attacks in
the past in which the government would handle the extreme range of
potential liability so that private insurers could offer consumers terrorism
insurance.134 However, these models have been criticized for being

130. After all, these attacks are foreseeable. Cable owners should be prepared for both
accidental and intentional breaches.
131. See supra Part III.A.
132. See discussion supra Part II.B.
133. In discussing a possible catastrophe pool created by tax dollars to compensate
victims of terrorist attacks and Katrina-like catastrophes, Robert J. Rhee argues that
taxpayers in average homes in Cleveland may resent having to fund the lifestyle of a
taxpayer in Miami and may perceive this to be unfair. Rhee, supra note 123, at 611-12.
134. Id. at 601.
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With subsidized insurance, policyholders pay
unsustainable.135
premiums that represent a mere percentage of the true actuarial risk.136
Thus the program is designed to be a loss-making program and is
sustainable only through continued government funding. 137 As a result,
the popularity and political viability of this plan is also unclear. Would
taxpayers support continually subsidizing the economic losses of others
no matter how large? How much economic damage would taxpayers be
willing to shoulder?
IV. PROPOSED MOVE TOWARD A HOLISTIC SOLUTION: INCREASE
REDUNDANCY AND SHIFT LIABILITY
What the above proposed solutions show is that there is no “silver
bullet” solution to undersea cable security and liability for cable
breaches. Merely increasing international cooperation and maritime
security, for example, will not be sufficient to prevent all attacks. Nor
will this increase in security do anything to compensate victims who lose
access to their data for a prolonged period of time. Likewise, a solution
focused entirely on increasing liability does little to improve the physical
security of the infrastructure itself. Therefore, any solution going
forward must be holistic. It must consider both ex-ante security
measures and ex-post liability. This article proposes a solution meant to
address both of these issues in the context of cloud computing - to ensure
that access to data remains safe and that victims can recover in the event
of a data breach. In doing so, this article draws from scholarship on
cybersecurity as well as public information on the governmentsubsidized insurance programs mentioned above. It also shifts the focus
on undersea cable liability away from the cable owner to the cloud data
storage providers and their insurers.
While the security of undersea cables is a specific problem having to
do with a particular piece of telecommunications infrastructure, undersea
cables are in fact just one part of a larger mesh that makes up the
Internet. A potential breach of cables is thus an issue of cybersecurity.
While many proposals to increase and improve cybersecurity, such as
building firewalls or repelling hackers,138 are inapplicable to undersea
135. Id. at 599.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 599.
138. See generally UNITED STATES COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM,
RECOMMENDED
PRACTICES,
https://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/practices/Recommended_Practices.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2012).
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cables due to their focus on software, other cybersecurity solutions that
incorporate infrastructure can be applied. One solution is the idea of
redundancy.139 While it may be efficient to have a single point of access
to one’s data, this approach creates the possibility of losing access to all
that data if that single point of access is destroyed.140 It is therefore
better to be redundant and inefficient: having information stored in
multiple locations and having multiple points of access to that data.141
Professor Derek Bambauer argues that inefficiency creates resiliency.142
Bambauer suggests that multiple data storage facilities and modes of
access can not only improve a user’s chance of being able to access their
data but can also deter intentional attacks.143 The less chance an attack
has to actually cause damage through data disruption, the less it will be
an attractive plan to an attacker.144 It is useful to think of a resilient
Internet as a hydra.145 Cut off multiple heads and the creature still
survives because each head is redundant. Therefore the incentive to cut
off just a few heads is reduced. Security is increased not through
additional patrols or naval exercises but by simply making the target less
attractive to potential attackers.146
To increase cybersecurity in general, Bambauer proposes
establishing information storage legislation that would require an
organization to maintain separate and redundant information in a way
that ensures that if it loses its primary source of data, it is able to restore
regular functionality within a day.147 His proposal involves penalties and

139. See generally Bambauer, supra note 12.
140. Bambauer, supra note 12, at 637; see also SYMFORM, REDUNDANT DATA STORAGE,
http://www.symform.com/join-the-revolution/how-symform-works/data-redundancy/
(last visited, Dec. 4, 2012) (pointing to Symform’s redundant cloud storage as what sets it
apart from its competitors and allows for greater guarantees of data safety).
141. Bambauer, supra note 12, at 637.
142. Id. at 638.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. An argument can be made that in the case of piracy, increased redundancy will be
ineffective. A more redundant system does not remove the attractiveness of a cable if the
purpose is to sell its components on the black market or for scrap. See Burnett, Cable
Vision, supra note 18, at 69. Also, Bambauer’s proposal assumes terrorists will act
rationally. Terrorists may still attack cable infrastructure as a symbolic gesture even if
the impact on the flow of data is minimal.
147. Bambauer, supra note 12, at 645. Bambauer looks at record keeping rules like the
Securities and Exchange requirement that accounting firms keep records related to
auditing and financial statements reviews for seven years after such reviews are
concluded. Id. These existing requirements suggest that private incentives for
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sanctions for non-compliance as a way to enforce the legislation.148
There are several issues that Bambauer himself raises about his
Bambauer acknowledges that establishing these
proposal.149
requirements through public law is challenging.150
Government
mandates risk being extremely expensive and poorly tailored, and the
speed of the legislative process increases the likelihood that mandates
will become rapidly obsolete.151 However, he argues that despite these
problems with legislation, relying on the private sector to develop best
practices may lead to insufficient precautions.152 Bambauer does not
resolve the specifics of his proposed legislation. He does not address the
scope of information that different organizations would be required to
store redundantly or the level and speed of functionality restoration that
would avoid triggering penalties. Although he acknowledges that
various industries would have to be treated differently,153 he does not
delve into those differences.
This article proposes creating a new kind of government-subsidized
insurance and certification plan, based on the idea of redundancy
advocated by Bambauer, as a way to protect undersea cables and their
users. Briefly, this article proposes that the government offer subsidized
insurance to cloud data providers who meet certain set redundancy
requirements. Those data providers who met the requirements would be
government certified, and consumers would be encouraged to utilize
these certified services. Consumers would be allowed to recover from
these certified companies, who would be backed by government
insurance, for economic damages due to loss of data access. While this
insurance is envisioned to be available to U.S. consumers, the model
itself could be followed in other countries.
Firstly, the U.S. government should work with private cable
operators154 and data storage providers to create a set of guidelines for

information storage are frequently inadequate, at least in comparison to larger societal
interest in that information. Id. at 641.
148. Id. at 647-48.
149. Id. at 667-69.
150. Id. at 642.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 643.
154. By having the government work with private companies, this plan hopes to avoid
the problems highlighted by Bambauer of either obsolete legislation or insufficient
precautions. See Bambauer, supra note 12 and accompanying text.

2013]

The Cloud and the Deep Sea

25

optimal redundancy.155 This is not simply a matter of determining the
minimum number of data center locations that a company like Google or
Amazon must have. The coalition should look at models of the effects of
potential undersea cable breaches to determine strategic placements of
data servers around the world, and to ensure that if a group of cables are
cut multiple data centers are still accessible. They should consider
expanding the use of domestic data centers as well.156 This coalition
should also look at the larger Internet infrastructure as a whole. It should
explore whether new technologies such as long-range WiFi157 could
reduce reliance on undersea cables by rerouting data in the event of a
breach. Both locations and technology should be diversified.
Once these guidelines are established, compliant companies would
be eligible to receive government-subsidized data disruption insurance.
Unlike flood insurance, which puts the burden on consumers to purchase
ex-ante insurance, the burden would be on the data storage companies
themselves to pay for the insurance. Once they had purchased this
insurance, these companies would be certified as “recommended and
insured cloud storage providers.”158 Users who chose to use these
recommended providers would be able to recover for economic loss in
the event of a cable breach leading to loss of data access. Government
funds would be available to insurance companies of certified data
providers in the event of terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other
catastrophic data disruptions.159
However, more standard data
disruptions, such as those caused by computer viruses or human error (by
155. A question that would have to be resolved is which executive agency would
spearhead this effort. The Federal Communications Commission would be an obvious
choice, given its regulation of other communications industries like terrestrial cable
companies and its experience working with private companies like AT & T. However, it
is possible that the Department of Homeland Security or the Department of Defense
could assume this task.
156. See supra Part III.B.
157. See generally Chris Burns, WiFi 802.22 Technology Promises Wireless Data Over 60
Miles: Say Goodbye to Data Plans, SLASHGEAR (July 29, 2011),
http://www.slashgear.com/wifi-802-22-technology-promises-wireless-data-over-60-milessay-goodbye-to-data-plans-29168407/.
158. The certification would be subject to ongoing audits. The standard for adequate
redundancy is likely to change over time as new technology is developed, and this system
should be prepared for that.
159. This proposal does not intend to change the fact that cable owners must handle all
repairs, and does not require their insurers to shoulder repair costs in cases of terrorist or
pirate attacks. It may be advisable to establish a rule forcing cable owners who do not
adequately protect their cables to pay fines that would be funneled into the proposed
insurance fund. What adequate precautions entail would have to be determined.
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a data storage provider’s employees), would be covered by the data
providers and their insurance companies.160 In other words, government
funds would be available in cases of large-scale disruptions outside of a
data storage company’s control.161
Several issues are raised by this particular proposal. The first issue is
whether the private sector would be willing to participate in such a plan.
For private insurance companies, they would be able to offer
comprehensive data disruption insurance without worrying about being
liable for billions of dollars in economic losses in the event of a terrorist
attack or undersea landslide. Therefore, it is likely that private insurance
companies would support this proposed arrangement. However, data
storage providers would be required to spend a great deal of money on
increasing their redundancy and would also have to pay insurance fees.
Furthermore, they would now be liable for the acts of third parties on
infrastructure like undersea cables that do not even belong to them. For
them, it would not seem like an attractive plan.
But two factors could be emphasized that would make data storage
provider participation more likely. First the government would pay for
the damage caused by third parties. Second, the hope is that the
certification would encourage users to utilize certified data storage
providers as “safer” options. Consumers who value the security of their
data and access to that data would likely migrate to these certified
services.162 In this regard the challenge would be publicizing and raising
awareness about the certification, such that consumer demand for
certified data storage makes the certification process sufficiently
attractive to data storage providers.
The second issue raised by this article’s proposed holistic solution is
sustainability. As discussed above, one of the main criticisms of the
government-subsidized flood insurance program is that floods continue
to occur and thus the government has to pay out a never-ending supply of

160. Whether or not companies should be allowed to continue to limit this liability will
have to be resolved.
161. This article does not address whether government insurance would cover
disruptions due to electricity loss. Attacks on the power grid are also a large concern in
cybersecurity and cloud computing. These issues, however, are beyond the scope of this
article.
162. Many companies have been skittish about moving their data to the cloud, but a
certification could help alleviate their fears. Arik Hesseldahl, Businesses Confront the Cloud
Security Threat, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 17, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/
stories/2010-06-17/businesses-confront-the-cloud-security-threatbusinessweek-business-newsstock-market-and-financial-advice.
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funds.163 In the case of data disruption, the insurance would be given out
only to those companies who met the agreed upon redundancy
requirements. As a result, only the most extreme terrorist attacks or
natural disasters would lead to losses. A breach of a few cables would be
covered due to redundancy and users would not experience a loss of
access to their data. Therefore, the amount of times the government
would actually have to pay out money to cover data disruptions would
likely be limited. Granted, the payouts in those infrequent cases could be
costly, potentially reaching into the billions of dollars depending on the
industries affected. However, as more technology is developed to create
new modes of access, such as through long-range WiFi or increased
satellite capacity, the risks of such catastrophic failure should decrease
even further.
Perhaps the largest problem with this proposal is the effect on
smaller cloud data storage providers who lack the funds to reach the
required redundancy. This problem would be especially acute if the
government decided to go one step further and require that any cloud
storage provider, no matter how small, would be liable for the economic
damages of its customers resulting from loss of access to data. As a
result, data storage companies would risk having to pay for all potential
damages unless they complied with the redundancy requirements and
purchased the subsidized insurance plan. While this further step by the
government would increase consumer security, the measure could crush
smaller data storage providers who are unable to build out sufficient
infrastructure to comply with the redundancy requirement. As a result,
cloud data storage would begin to be consolidated into the hands of
fewer and more powerful players.164
This consolidation may not be a bad thing. By having such stringent
requirements, the cloud computing system would begin to closely
resemble a U.S. utility system. Smaller companies could “interconnect”
with larger storage providers like Google or Amazon to ensure coverage
by the government-subsidized insurance. The larger companies like
Google would be more heavily regulated but could also benefit from
greater market share and the interconnection fees from smaller
companies. This article does not endorse such a dramatic change, but the
government should at least consider whether protecting consumers and
163. See discussion supra Part III.C.
164. Matthew Mitchell, The Pathology of Privilege: The Economic Consequences of
Government Favoritism, MERCATUS RESEARCH (July 8, 2012), http://mercatus.org/
publication/pathology-privilege-economic-consequences-government-favoritism (discussing
the issues of monopoly, antitrust, and abuse of power that are raised by such consolidation).
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the economy warrant more extreme measures. Even under the less
extreme plan proposed in this article, the government will have to
consider whether the protection of consumer access to data should be
placed above the interests of smaller cloud storage providers.
V. CONCLUSION
Just as it is impossible to fully prevent cyber-attacks,165 it is
impossible to prevent attacks on the vast web of undersea cables.
Retaliation and other reactive measures for these attacks would not do
anything to remedy the situation.166 As a result, successful cybersecurity,
including undersea cable security, must focus on ex-ante redundancy.
This article has proposed a plan to encourage cloud data providers to
increase redundancy and has also provided a mechanism by which
consumers could be protected from economic loss stemming from
disruptions to their data access.
If this plan were to be implemented, there would likely be a shift of
consumers toward certified data storage providers. As a result, more
consumers would be relying on highly redundant systems to access their
data. Terrorists looking to attack Internet infrastructure would find that
attacking cables would have far less of an effect as the data flowing
through the disrupted cables would simply be rerouted through alternate
cables and technologies. The target would be less attractive and thus
more secure. This article argues that the best way to increase the security
of undersea cables is to rely on them less.
It is important to remember, however, that the economies of the
world are increasingly intertwined. As a result, while this proposal is
targeted at the U.S. government and legal system, it is imperative that
other nations also consider not only increasing security of cables in their
waters, but also providing recourse for their own citizens in the event of
data disruptions. If companies in India or China suffer data disruptions
and lack any recourse or compensation, those effects will be felt
globally. If countries protect their consumers from cyber-attacks,
whether they are attacks on undersea cables or computer viruses, data
around the world will be safer and the global economy will grow more
resilient.

165. Bambauer, supra note 12, at 673.
166. Id.

